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Introduction 
During the Cold War, United States foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa had little to do with 
Africa.[1] As with other developing regions, African countries were first and foremost pawns in the 
great global chess game. Republican and Democratic Administrations alike supported American 
clients and sought to undermine Soviet ones. Economic and military assistance was directed to 
key allies, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and anticommunist 
rebel organizations, such as Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total 
de Angola) in Angola.[2] Because the U.S. perceived few if any direct strategic or economic 
interests in Africa, engagement with the region was largely defined by Cold War logic from the 
late 1950s until the late 1980s, and remained relatively limited.[3] As it became clear that the Cold 
War was winding down, Africa watchers began to ponder the future of U.S. relations with the 
continent. Idealists hoped that the United States would now be free to pursue policies that would 
address Africa's own problems, most of which were traced to the failure of economic 
development, authoritarian governance, and/or ongoing conflicts, while realists feared that Africa 
would become even more marginalized.[4] In fact, U.S. Africa policy writ large passed rapidly 
through two quite different transitional phases, before settling in somewhere between them. 
The New World Order 
The first transitional period reflected the euphoria of the immediate post-Cold War moment, in 
which a "New World Order," including positive U.S. engagement with a continent in which it 
perceived few significant national interests, seemed possible. In this period, the George H.W. 
Bush and Bill Clinton administrations pursued similar strategies of positive, pro-active 
engagement. In the area of conflict management, the U.S., Russia, Portugal, Cuba, and South 
Africa began working together in 1988 to mediate a negotiated settlement to the Angolan civil war, 
which each had previously contributed to perpetuating.[5] Political reform took center stage in 
1990, as the U.S., Britain and France each announced that future foreign assistance to Africa 
would be conditioned upon democratization.[6] The U.S. made good on this vow in the following 
two years, cutting off assistance to long-time Cold War allies that resisted political liberalization 
(Zaire, Liberia and Sudan), and shifting resources to countries actively engaged in 
democratization (South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique). The most visible monument to this 
euphoric moment was the 1992-1993 humanitarian intervention in Somalia. 
On December 3, 1992, the U.N. Security Council, concluding that the situation in Somalia had 
become "intolerable," authorized the dispatch of military forces to ensure the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance in a land best by widespread starvation and suffering, thus saving the 
country from a complete breakdown of law and order. For the United Nations, and especially for 
the United States, which had taken a leading role in urging the intervention, this decision was 
almost unprecedented. Not since the 1840s, when Britain, France, and the United States 
dispatched cruisers to the west coast of Africa in order to hunt down slave ships, had the world 
seen a major military operation devoid of any strategic or economic benefit. Events in Somalia 
give force to the idea that humanitarian intervention in certain specific situations is demanded by 
the traditions and values to which the United States stands committed.[7] 
This sentiment, widespread in December 1992 as U.S. Marines landed on the beaches of 
Mogadishu, evaporated in the wake of the October 1993 firefight that left 18 U.S. Rangers dead. 
Retreat from Africa[8] 
The second transitional period in post-Cold War U.S. policy toward Africa began with the 
withdrawal from Somalia in early 1994. This was a period of disengagement driven by the 
"Somalia Syndrome." Reeling from the debacle in Somalia, and with the Rwandan genocide 
already unfolding, Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which sought to 
strictly limit future U.N. missions, and especially U.S. participation in them. It listed seven factors 
that American officials would consider before approving U.N. operations to be carried out by non-
Americans, and six additional factors to be considered if U.S. forces were to participate. The turn 
away from the idealist vision of the immediate post-Cold War moment, which Bush called the 
"New World Order" and Clinton called "Assertive Multilateralism," could not have been more 
dramatic. The first two considerations in approving even U.N. operations that excluded U.S. 
participation were whether the operation would advance U.S. interests, and whether there was a 
clear threat to international peace and security.[9] The disinterested humanitarian moment was 
over.  
The first test of the new policy would be the genocide in Rwanda, already ongoing when PDD 
was released on May 3. It was clear that the U.S. would not be involved, and U.S. officials did 
whatever they could to see that the U.N. did not initiate a response that might draw the U.S. in 
later. Requests from General Romeo Dallaire, commander of U.N. forces in Rwanda to monitor 
implementation of the Abuja Accords ending the war between the government and the Rwandan 
Patriot Front, for reinforcements to preempt the genocide had already been declined and when 
the genocide began all U.N. forces were immediately withdrawn. While intervention in Rwanda 
could be rejected on most of the factors set out in PDD 25, there was the problem of the 
obligation to act against genocide under the Geneva Conventions. As a result, Clinton 
Administration officials danced around "the g word," refusing to refer to the Rwandan genocide as 
such until it had taken its course, and the lives of 800,000 people.[10] In the end, a very late U.N. 
approved intervention by France was the only response by the international community.[11]  
PDD 25 also called for subregional organizations to shoulder more of the peacekeeping burden, 
with U.N. Security Council endorsement, further distancing the U.S. from future engagement in 
general, and in Africa (where most U.N. peacekeepers are posted) in particular. The U.S. and 
U.N. were already supporting the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) to resolve the Liberian conflict, having refused any direct involvement. U.S. direct 
support to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) peacemaking operation averaged a 
miniscule $15 million annually between 1991 and 1996, when a peace agreement finally began to 
be implemented.[12] (For purposes of comparison, Nigeria, which shouldered the vast majority of 
the costs of the operation, spent about $1 billion.[13]) In the early years of the operation (1991-
1993), when ECOMOG struggled to establish control over the conflict situation, the U.S. was the 
only significant external contributor.[14] Despite the myriad difficulties associated with this 
operation, it could be spun as support for the view that the African continent could solve its own 
problems without significant external support. In fact, conflict dynamics that soon would threaten 
the security of much of the West African subregion were incubating in the Liberian countryside, 
while ECOMOG remained largely confined to the capital Monrovia, and on its own.  
Concerns about insecurity in Africa, and the threat of being drawn into dealing with conflicts in 
which it had no interests, also dampened U.S. support for democratization in this period. The 
roots of genocide in Rwanda were deep, but among the immediate precipitating factors was 
external pressure to democratize.[15] Political liberalization was associated with increased 
insecurity in several other countries in the mid-1990s, including in the Central African Republic, 
Congo-Brazzaville, and Lesotho, but most disconcertingly in Rwanda's neighbor Burundi, which 
was itself on the brink of civil war, and perhaps genocide, after its first democratically elected 
President was assassinated in a coup attempt in October 1993, just four months after his election. 
When the democratic regime there was overturned in a successful coup in July 1996, which 
brought former President Major Pierre Buyoya back to power, the U.S. and other major powers 
supported the new government in the hope that Buyoya would be able to improve the security 
situation, even while East African countries attempted to impose sanctions against the non-
democratic government. Elsewhere in Africa, political and military elites had by this time figured 
out how to "comply" with U.S. demands for elections without threatening their grip on power. As a 
result, the modal regime in Africa in the mid-1990s was 'electoral authoritarian.'[16] The United 
States' was particularly friendly with a group of Presidents it referred to as a "new generation of 
African leaders," all of whom were seriously engaged in rebuilding collapsed state institutions, 
while generally rejecting the relevance of multiparty democracy to their circumstances.[17] This 
policy of supporting stabilization over liberalization might have fared better had the new 
generation of African leaders not ended up at war with one another shortly thereafter.[18]  
U.S. assistance to Africa had been declining since the late 1980s, largely as a result of the virtual 
elimination of Security Assistance and Economic Support Funds to former Cold War allies.[19] In 
1995, Congress moved to restructure and significantly reduce U.S. foreign assistance programs. 
Many questioned the rationale for assisting Africa in the post-Cold War era, noting that three 
decades of aid had achieved little, either in terms of growth and democratization or promoting U.S. 
interests. Congressional supporters of aid to Africa rallied against the initiative and succeeded in 
preempting significant new cuts. Aid declined in 1996, but only marginally, as in previous 
years.[20] 
African Solutions to African Problems 
A third period of post-Cold War U.S.-Africa relations began with the adoption of the rhetoric of 
"African Solutions to African Problems" in the first year of Clinton's second term in office. This 
was far from a serious reengagement, indeed some called it "virtual engagement,"[21] but it did 
represent recognition that the U.S. could not afford complete disengagement from Africa. The 
lesson of Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia taken together was that the U.S. could not engage 
directly, could not do nothing, and could not expect African forces to contain instability on their 
own. And so the search began for alternatives that would combine U.S. financial resources and 
African human resources for conflict resolution/peacekeeping, political reform, and economic 
development.  
Military Policy 
In the face of a very real possibility in 1996 that Burundi would follow Rwanda over the brink, the 
Clinton Administration proposed the creation of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The 
idea was to create a standing force of about 5000 African troops, trained and equipped by 
Western countries, which could be deployed rapidly for peacekeeping operations endorsed by the 
U.N.[22] Unveiled in October 1996, the proposal received a decidedly cool reaction from virtually 
all quarters. The plan seemed to represent an abdication of responsibility and a neo-imperial 
impulse simultaneously. Britain and France, both of which had ongoing military training programs 
with a number of African countries, were disinclined to follow the American lead, especially in a 
region in which they had extensive involvement and the U.S. had little. Regional powers South 
Africa and Nigeria, which the Clinton Administration had hoped would take a leadership role in 
ACRF, made it clear that they had no interest.  
By the end of the year ACRF was undergoing a fundamental redefinition, from which emerged the 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The idea of a standing rapid deployment force was 
gone, and ACRI became a bilateral training program, designed to improve the capabilities of 
national forces to participate in peacekeeping activities. South Africa and Nigeria remained cool, 
but other countries agreed to accept the training and equipment, beginning with Malawi, Senegal, 
and Uganda. ACRI provided training and equipment exclusively for peacekeeping, not 
peacemaking. The U.S. was rightly concerned not to be perceived to be contributing, even 
inadvertently, to conflict. However, this cautious approach failed to mollify critics who were quick 
to point to cases were ACRI-provided equipment was being used against internal and external 
enemies,[23] and left ACRI open to the more fundamental criticism that training for peacekeeping 
in a region where interventions would almost always need to be of the peacemaking type 
seriously limited ACRI's relevance.[24] Others suggested that African militaries lack financing and 
logistics, not training, making any training program of limited usefulness.[25]  
In the transition from the Clinton to the George W. Bush administration, ACRI evolved into the 
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which concentrates 
on “training the trainer,” delivering programs designed to address the specific needs of the 
recipient country, and training for peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping. Between 1997 
and 2005, the U.S. spent $121 million to train 10,000 troops from nine countries (Benin, 
Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal). In 2005 ACOTA 
became a constituent part of the Bush administration's multilateral five-year Global Peace 
Operations Initiative (GPOI) program, which, with the support of the G-8, aims to train 75,000 
peacekeepers, mostly in Africa, and foster an international transportation and logistics support 
system for peacekeepers.[26] Thus, the most serious criticisms of ACRI have now been 
addressed, U.S.-European cooperation has been consolidated, and South Africa and Nigeria 
have agreed to take part in GPOI training. Along the way, the idea of deploying newly trained 
peacekeepers as a unit has fallen by the wayside. The mission now is to maintain a steady flow 
of forces to support U.N., and to a lesser extent regional, peacekeeping operations. In its first 
year (FY2005) GPOI more than doubled the number of peacekeepers trained. The U.S. 
contribution to GPOI in FY05 was $96.7 million, about two thirds of which went to Africa.[27]  
However, the State Department and Congress are still assessing the most fundamental issue: 
"Are international training efforts through GPOI and its predecessor programs having the desired 
effect?"[28] African countries doubled their military contributions to U.N. peacekeeping between 
the end of 2000 and the end of 2004, and five of the top ten contributors had received training 
under ACRI/ACOTA.[29] This is not very strong evidence, given that half of the contributors did 
not receive training, and there is no evidence as to whether those that did are outperforming 
those that did not, or even whether those that received the training were the ones deployed.  
Recent deployments by the African Union (AU) in Sudan, and ECOWAS in Côte d'Ivoire and 
Liberia suggest that with sufficient external financial and logistical support these organizations 
can make an important contribution to peacekeeping, but only as junior partners in international 
coalitions for the foreseeable future. In Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, ECOWAS was willing and able 
to deploy quickly and effectively (once adequate financial and logistical support was guaranteed 
by the France and the United States, respectively), but needed reinforcement in short order. The 
AU effort in Sudan, making use of some of the continent's most capable armed forces, had more 
difficulty getting forces to Darfur in a timely manner, but once there performed well initially, within 
the constraints imposed by an inadequate mandate. Within a short period of time, however, it 
became clear that this operation would also need to be taken over by the U.N. as AU resources 
were quickly exhausted. As of the end of 2006, the UN has failed to get approval from the 
government of Sudan for a chapter VI intervention, or from the U.N. Security Council for a chapter 
VII intervention, leaving the AU force desperately trying to hold on, as violence spills into 
neighboring countries.  
The Bush administration has taken the lead in the UN operation in Liberia, and has publicly 
supported a chapter VII intervention to stop what it calls "genocide" in Darfur. Policy in these two 
cases indicates some recovery from the Somalia Syndrome, but also demonstrates its continuing 
influence. The United States was under extreme international pressure to intervene as rebel 
forces began encircling Monrovia in the summer of 2003. Former colonial powers Britain and 
France were already engaged in UN peacekeeping operations in neighboring Sierra Leone and 
Côte d'Ivoire, respectively, and the stability of those countries was threatened by the intensifying 
war in Liberia.  
The Bush administration eventually agreed to support a ceasefire, but only if and after President 
Charles Taylor resigned and left the country, and only if ECOWAS provided an initial stabilization 
force. Following the Bush Administration's lead, Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo agreed to 
deploy 1500 Nigerian troops, constituted as the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), but only 
if and after financial and logistical support had been guaranteed by the U.S. Both conditions were 
met relatively quickly, and the U.N. authorized a multinational force for Liberia on August 1.  
As Taylor took off from Monrovia for exile in Nigeria on August 11, U.S. war ships, prepositioned 
off the Liberian coast, moved close enough to be visible on the horizon from Monrovia. Joint Task 
Force Liberia included three ships and 5000 service members. However, only 200 Marines 
actually went ashore, and then only for a ten-day show of support to the ECOMIL force (August 
14 to 24). The U.N. Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 
on September 19, and authority was transferred from ECOMIL to UNMIL on October 1, with 3500 
ECOMIL forces "rehatted" as the initial element in an approved force of 15,000.  
This was a very cautious return to African peacekeeping for the U.S. military, but one that 
nevertheless achieved its immediate goal of establishing a sustainable cease-fire, which in turn 
led to internationally supervised elections in October 2005, and a U.N. post-conflict reconstruction 
program in which the U.S. remains the lead country. The U.S. government allocated $1.15 billion 
to reconstruction efforts in Liberia between FY2004 and FY2006.[30] It is important to remember 
that the U.S. has a "special" relationship with Liberia historically, and would be very unlikely to 
commit this level of resources to any other country. Furthermore, the sustainability of the peace 
and stability in Liberia is far from guaranteed, and a failure here would constitute strike two in U.S. 
engagement with African peacekeeping.  
If Liberia demonstrates the application of lessons learned from Somalia, Sudan demonstrates 
lessons learned from Rwanda. The conflict in Darfur began in April 2003 when two allied rebel 
movements attacked a military installation in the region. Within months, local "Arab" janjaweed 
militia forces were systematically expelling "African" farmers from their land, killing, raping, and 
burning villages as they went. Within a year, scores of thousands (conservatively) were dead and 
millions displaced. In February 2004, the Institute for the Study of Genocide issued an action alert 
alleging "genocide," and in June, the Committee on Conscience of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Museum followed suit.[31] On July 22 both Houses of the U.S. Congress unanimously passed 
Concurrent Resolutions (S.Con.Res. 133 and H.Con.Res. 467), declaring that genocide was 
taking place in Darfur.[32] Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that he was unsure about 
whether the situation in Darfur amounted to genocide, but would go to Sudan and see for himself. 
Upon his return in September, he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that 
he concurred: genocide was indeed under way in Sudan. Powell went on to say that as a 
contracting party to the Geneva Convention, the U.S. would demand that the United Nations 
initiate a full investigation.[33]  
Beyond these initiatives, U.S. policy remained the same: diplomatic support for AU efforts to 
facilitate a negotiated settlement to the conflict, which began in early 2004, diplomatic and 
financial support (in the amount of $150 million in its first two years) for the African Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS), which deployed in August 2004, and more recently stepped up pressure on the 
U.N. to deploy "a credible and effective international force."[34] In short, the U.S. has largely 
avoided the criticism that followed from Rwanda, without being seriously engaged in taking 
direction action under the Geneva Convention. This position has been facilitated by the 
willingness of China and Russia to veto stronger U.N. action in the Security Council.  
Economic Policy 
Although the rhetoric of "African Solutions to African Problems" is generally applied specifically to 
conflict resolution and peacekeeping issues, it captures the thrust of U.S. political and economic 
policies in Africa in this period as well. It should not be understood to mean that African's should 
be free to choose among potential solutions to their problems, but rather that Africans should 
shoulder more of the responsibility of implementing solutions that American officials tend to see 
as universal. This is well illustrated by the U.S. Agency for International Development's Bureau 
for Africa Vision Statement:  
The African Bureau will set the standard of excellence in fostering successful African-led 
development. Our mission is to reduce poverty and improve the quality of life throughout the 
region so that Africans and Africa can achieve their full potential. In so doing, we will draw on the 
American values of democracy and social and economic freedom.[35]  
The political conditionalities placed on economic assistance in the early 1990s remain in place, 
and quiet exceptions continue to be made for special friends (most notably Rwanda, which got a 
wink and a nod in response to elections in 2003 that made a mockery of democratic practice). 
However, as in the conflict and peacekeeping realm, the U.S. has attempted to shift more of the 
responsibility for political reform to Africans in the last decade. Evidence from the early 1990s 
suggested that the conditionality stick could be relatively effective in encouraging the adoption of 
democratic procedures, but was much less effective in facilitating the emergence of substantive 
democracy in a region where the social, economic, and institutional supports for democracy are 
weak to nonexistent. In response, U.S. democracy support programs have increasingly 
emphasized strengthening civil society in order to empower local democracy advocates to 
demand good governance and increased accountability for themselves.  
More recently, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) signed by President Clinton in 
1997, and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), established by President Bush in 2003, 
have become the centerpieces of political and economic policies in Africa. AGOA provides 
preferential access to the U.S. market for democratic countries in Africa, and MCA provides 
economic assistance to impoverished democracies anywhere in the world. Under AGOA, the 
President designates countries as AGOA eligible if they have established or "are making 
progress toward establishing" market-based economies, the rule of law and political pluralism, the 
elimination of trade and investment barriers, the protection of intellectual property, efforts to 
combat corruption, policies to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health care and 
educational opportunities, protection of human rights and worker rights, and the elimination of 
certain child labor practices.[36] Both Presidents Bush and Clinton designated most African 
countries as AGOA eligible, including some of the most egregious violators of the principles on 
the eligibility list. For example, in 2006 Guinea is AGOA eligible despite being rated "not free" by 
Freedom House, and ranking as the most corrupt country in Africa in Transparency International’s 
global corruption indices.[37] Recognizing the political pressures involved in presidential 
certification of eligibility, the MCA makes a more serious effort to target resources to democratic 
regimes by determining eligibility based on 16 quantitative indicators, which measure the same 
qualities set out in the AGOA eligibility list.[38] As a result, in 2006 37 African countries were 
AGOA eligible, but only 11 were MCA eligible.  
As economic policy instruments, and therefore as political policy instruments, AGOA and MCA 
leave much to be desired. AGOA is the institutional embodiment of the "trade not aid" rhetoric of 
the mid- to late-1990s, in which American and African leaders, most notably Yoweri Museveni of 
Uganda, agreed that increased access to the American market would facilitate economic growth 
and development in Africa more effectively than had decades of foreign assistance. However, the 
provisions of AGOA included multiple protections for American producers who might be harmed, 
even marginally, by competition from Africa. Although the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative has perennially celebrated the success of AGOA since its implementation in 2000, 
the reality provides little if any cause for celebration. Oil exports have always accounted for the 
majority of African exports to the U.S. under AGOA. While the U.S. has a clear interest in 
increasing its market share in African oil exports, the oil sector is unlikely to drive more broad 
based economic growth and development in Africa. As a result, much attention has been given to 
the boost in textile exports from Africa to the U.S. under AGOA, precisely because textiles were a 
critical niche market for Asian countries at the earliest stages of their economic transformations. 
However, with the expiration of textile quotas under the Multi Fiber Agreement at the beginning of 
2005, Chinese exports swamped the American market and imports from Africa declined 
precipitously. With other non-oil sectors declining even more significantly between 2004 and 2005, 
oil came to account for 92% of African AGOA exports to the U.S. in 2005.[39]  
The Millennium Challenge Account is also a response to the ineffectiveness of traditional foreign 
assistance programs, as well as the institutional embodiment of the shift in "the Washington 
consensus" away from structural adjustment toward poverty reduction and recipient country 
'ownership.' The MCA has been well received in principle, but was slow to begin actually 
committing funds, and partly as a result is currently funded well below initial stated intentions.[40] 
Eligible countries are encouraged to take ownership of their development agendas, identify 
problems and propose solutions, which the U.S. will then consider funding. At the end of 2006 25 
countries were eligible for MCA funding, of which 11 were African, and MCA had actually signed 
Compacts with 9 countries, including four in Africa (Madagascar, Cape Verde, Benin, and Ghana). 
The amounts committed were in line with traditional levels of assistance, and the programs 
funded all reflected the new Washington consensus.[41] Overall, U.S. non-emergency economic 
assistance to Africa remains extremely meager—18 centers per capita according to Sachs' 
calculations for 2003.[42] 
The U.S. and Africa Post-9/11: Awakening or Deja Vu? 
Longer-term U.S. engagement with Africa is likely to be defined in terms of the perceived 
increase in U.S. interests in the region as a result of international terrorism, increased 
dependence on African oil, and the dramatic engagement of China with the continent in recent 
years. Although the September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) asserts that " America is 
now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones," the implications of this for 
Africa appear relatively modest.[43] With respect to the threat of international terrorism, the NSS 
pledges to work with European allies to "help strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build 
indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and 
intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists."[44]  
In practice, this policy has taken two distinct forms: the deployment of the Combined Joint Task 
Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in December 2002, and the Pan-Sahel Initiative/Trans-Sahel 
Counter Terrorism Initiative, which also began in late 2002. CJTF-HOA, staffed by about 1500 
troops, has the mission of "detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist 
groups operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material assistance 
for transnational terrorism in the region."[45] Initially, it was driven by concerns that terrorists 
fleeing from Afghanistan would be attracted to the 'vast ungoverned spaces' of the Horn of Africa. 
When such a mass influx failed to materialize, and the local terrorist threat proved to be relatively 
limited, CJTF-HOA began giving greater emphasis to its role in preventing terrorism by providing 
humanitarian assistance and waging a hearts and minds campaign. Its web page characterizes 
its current activities as working "to prevent conflict, promote regional stability, and protect 
Coalition interests in east Africa and Yemen through humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, 
consequence management, civil action programs to include medical and veterinary care, school 
and medical clinic construction, water development projects."[46]  
The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was a more indirect effort to boost the border defense capabilities 
of countries to the West of the Horn: Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. With a tiny budget of $8.4 
million, it trained at least one rapid reaction force of about 150 soldiers in each of the four 
countries in 2003 and 2004. Clearly the budget of PSI was too small for it to have much of an 
impact on the recipient countries, but the Administration was sufficiently satisfied with the 
program to create an expanded follow on Trans-Sahel Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). 
Under the TSCTI, the program expanded to include Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and 
Tunisia (in addition to the original four countries) and gave more emphasis to regional 
cooperation. The budget for TSCTI was initially proposed to be $100 million a year for five years, 
but it is funded at the level of $16.75 in FY07, its first year of budgeted funding.  
The resources devoted to both efforts are far below what would be required to achieve the stated 
goals of strengthening states in general, and their policing and intelligence capabilities in 
particular. Furthermore, the fact that these state/border strengthening initiatives stretch across the 
continent, essentially tracing the boundary between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, which 
is much more integrated with the Middle East, suggests that the underlying goal is to insulate 
Africa from threats to U.S. interests emanating from elsewhere, rather than to engage Africa itself. 
Beyond this specific counterterrorism strategy, the NSS sets out three interlocking strategies for 
Africa: giving "focused attention" to anchor states such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and 
Ethiopia, coordinating with European allies and international institutions for constructive conflict 
mediation and peace operations, and strengthening Africa's capable reforming states and sub-
regional organizations as the primary means of addressing transnational threats, which adds up 
essentially to more 'African solutions to African problems.'[47]  
Aside from the concern with terrorism, Africa’s oil has become an increasing attraction to the 
United States. In May 2001 the Cheney report warned that the U.S. would grow increasingly 
dependent upon foreign oil in the years to come and recommended that as a matter of policy the 
Bush Administration work to increase production and export of oil from regions other than the 
Middle East, noting that Latin America and West Africa were likely to be the fasting growing 
sources of future U.S. oil imports.[48] Africa supplies about 15% of U.S. oil imports, but with 
African production growing at twice the global rate, it could be supplying the U.S. with as much 
energy as the Middle East within a decade.[49] Three months later, Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner declared that African oil "has become a national strategic 
interest.[50] " This statement is particularly noteworthy in that it uses the language of the Carter 
Doctrine in the Middle East, in which President Carter went on to declare that the U.S. would 
intervene by any means necessary to protect its national interest in Middle Eastern oil. In April 
2002, Donald Norland, former U.S. Ambassador to Chad told a Congressional subcommittee: "It's 
been reliably reported that, for the first time, the two concepts—'Africa' and 'U.S. national 
security'—have been used in the same sentence in Pentagon documents."[51] Having declared 
African oil to be of strategic interest to the United States, the Bush Administration has not taken 
the second step to actually apply the Carter Doctrine to Africa. This has left U.S. policy open to 
criticism from both sides. The Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on U.S. policy in Africa 
has criticized it for failing "to make a geopolitical shift to pay sufficient attention to West Africa's 
energy rich Gulf of Guinea,"[52] while others see a neo-imperial push unfolding in the sub-
region.[53] 
Conclusion: Future Directions 
The most significant challenge to U.S. policy in Africa in the coming years may be China. The 
immediate topic of most strategic discussions regarding China and Africa is oil competition. 
"Twenty years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter. Now it is the world's second-
largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand."[54] 
Just as the U.S. is recognizing the importance of African oil to its interests, China is actively 
seeking to expand its own market share. But China's economic (and thus political) engagement of 
Africa since the turn of the century goes far beyond the hunt for energy. China's overall trade with 
Africa doubled from 2002 to 2003, and then doubled again between 2003 and 2005. This 400% 
growth in three years comes atop 700% growth in the decade of the 1990s, and there is no end in 
sight. China is now Africa's third largest trading partner, behind the U.S. and France, and ahead 
of former colonial power Britain.[55]  
Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa has grown equally dramatically from about $50 million 
annually between the mid 1990s and 2002, to $100 million in 2003 and $430 million in 2004.[56] 
This budding economic relationship is supported by the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, 
established by China in 2000 to bring Chinese and African leaders together every three years, 
much as the France-Africa summit had done throughout the postcolonial period. China comes to 
Africa as "the largest developing country in the world ... [, s]haring similar historical experience" 
and committed to establishing "a new type of strategic partnership with Africa which features 
political equality and mutual trust."[57] In other words, China maintains a policy of strict 
noninterference in the internal affairs of its African partners, and seeks mutually beneficial 
engagement, not humanitarian paternalism. Thus Chinese engagement in Africa threatens to 
substantially reduce the leverage of the U.S. and its Western allies, and thereby undermine the 
political and economic reform agendas the West has been pushing in Africa for two decades. 
More than this, however, successful economic engagement by China could open a huge new 
market for trade and investment, which it would be in position to dominate. The political 
implications of an economically emerging Africa in close alliance with China are disconcerting in 
the U.S. policy circles.[58] China's engagement in Africa may soon challenge the longstanding 
American perception that 'there is no there there,' and encourage serious, interest-driven U.S. 
engagement with Africa for the first time in history.  
Africa has always been marginal to U.S. interests and policies in the world. However, U.S. Africa 
relations may be approaching a critical juncture. U.S. policy could evolve toward engaging Africa 
on its own terms for mutual benefit, or it could settle back into the Cold War mold, treating Africa 
as a humanitarian ward of the international community and so many pawns in global geopolitical 
struggles. History, even very recent history, suggests that the latter is the far more likely course. 
Heady rhetoric about the role of Africa in the war on terrorism has amounted to very little actual 
change in the U.S. approach to Africa over the last five years. The excitement generated by the 
possibility of using African oil to reduce dependence on less politically reliable sources, is driven 
not least by the fact that much of Africa's oil reserve lies offshore, where it can be exploited with 
minimal involvement in what happens on land. And the China challenge might well be met as the 
Soviet challenge was, with renewed efforts to carve out a sphere of influence as an end in itself. 
The currents of history and bureaucratic inertia will continue to push in this direction. Only 
sustained and energetic leadership at the highest levels can overcome the drift and steer a new 
course. 
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